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ABSTRACT 
 
The continuous and discrete models of labour force training are being built. The application of the results 
from the theory of differential games and dynamic programming allows presenting the optimal strategies of 
labour force training that can be calculated. 
Keywords: Continuous game-theoretical model, discrete game-theoretical model, labour force training. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION  
 
The economic demand on “educated” (high-skill) 
employees has been grown recently. The expected 
discounted salaries of high-skill employees have 
grown. Thus, the investments of time, effort and 
money into education have been attracting more 
and more citizens. The “educated employees” are 
supposed to be competent workers that have all the 
required skills and knowledge to accomplish their 
responsibilities.  
The education can reduce unemployment all over 
the world and Russia is not the exception. 
Education is an investment project with additional 
positive or negative benefit. The educational service 
is characterized by immateriality and variability; 
it’s difficult for consumers to estimate its quality. 
It’s also hard to compare this service with 
analogous services. These facts stipulated the 
complexity of labour force training research.  
The problem of labour force training research 
and necessity to enlarge the employees’ level of 
education can be solved via economic- 
mathematical methods. 
 
2. MODELING OF LABOR MARKETS AND 
EDUCATIONAL SERVICES 
Relying on one of the most important elements of 
the state policy in the field of optimizing the costs 
of education, which is connected with the formation 
and development of the education system - the labor 
market - the economy. This structural model 
reflects the picture of the dynamics of labor 
resources: at the input - the birth rate vector, at the 
output - the gross regional product (GRP). From the 
position of macroeconomics in this scheme, a 
person acts as an impersonal labor resource 
necessary for the production of goods and services 
[1].  
The need for specialists with higher education for 
the economy can be calculated in a standard way, 
based on a change in certain factors shown in 
Figure 1 [2]. 
 
Figure 1 - Factors determining the need for 
specialists with higher education 
Under the influence of these factors, the region's 
need for cadres with a higher education in the year t 
on specialty i is formed. 
𝑅𝑡
𝑖 = 𝑅𝑒𝑡
𝑖 + 𝑅𝑜𝑡
𝑖                                                    (1) 
Where Rt
i
 – the need of the state in the year t in 
staff with a higher education in the specialty i;  
Ret
i
 – need of the economy in a year t in 
specialists with higher education in the specialty i;  
Rot
i
 – need of society in a year t in obtaining 
higher and postgraduate education in the specialty i. 
Participants in the educational process, between 
which the material relationship takes place, are: 
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students, organizations providing educational 
services; persons and organizations that pay for 
these services (in the role of which are the societies 
and the labor market). 
Before solving the problem of synthesis of SDS 
(complex dynamic systems), it is necessary to solve 
the problem of their analysis, which consists in 
decomposition of a complex system into 
subsystems and establishment of connections 
between them. 
The representation of the labor market (RT) as a 
manager makes it possible, taking into account the 
principles of system analysis, to detail the 
interconnected modules with the subsequent 
possibility of building a low-level model with their 
integration into the global complex model. 
Individuals demand for higher education as an 
investment asset, which also has some consumer 
value. Having studied, the graduate offers his labor 
in the labor market of educated specialists at the 
equilibrium rate for his specialty and works until 
the end of his career. The general equilibrium in the 
labor market of specialists and higher education 
determines the wages of skilled workers, their share 
in the employed population, the share of students in 
the population from 17 to 21 years, and the 
equilibrium number of HEIs and their optimal size. 
The salary of unskilled workers is exogenous and 
constant due to the presence of an unlimited number 
of such workers. 
It is also assumed that the rate of change in 
output in the economy is significantly lower than 
the speed described in the model of processes that 
we have constructed, so we assume that aggregated 
output is exogenous and fixed. As a result, changes 
in technology are caused only by changes in the 
demand for skilled and unskilled labor, and changes 
in output occur after equilibrium is established in 
the education and labor markets. 
The economy consists of two sectors: the 
national economy (including the service sector, 
except for higher education) and the system of 
higher education. 
Retaining the notation used in the work of 
Shevchuk D.V [1] and supplementing them with 
indices, we have. All population L divided into 
educated workers C , teachers E , students S and 
uneducated workers N , here the equality N + C + E 
+ S = L. Thus, there are three decision-makers in 
the economy: individuals, the labor market and 
universities. It is advisable to consider each of them 
separately. 
Individuals live two unequal periods: at the 
beginning of the first one everyone decides to work 
for him as an uneducated worker or to study and 
does it all the time; in the second he works in 
accordance with his level of education. 
When deciding on education, the individual tries 
to maximize his life-long discounted income, which 
is the sum of the terms of the geometric progression 
with the denominator β and the first member wN  , 
equal to some equilibrium salary of an uneducated 
person. From the theory of analysis of financial 
rents, it follows that the income is determined by 
the formula: 
∑ 𝛽𝑠𝑤𝑁 = 𝑤𝑁
1 − 𝛽𝑇
1 − 𝛽
.
𝑇
𝑠=0
 
This stream is compared with the flow of an 
educated person who will pay for the year of study 
for i specialty price p(i) and immediately after 
graduating from the university will begin to receive 
the equilibrium annual salary of an educated 
specialist wh(i) for simplicity in the form of an 
annuity: 
− ∑ 𝛽𝑠𝑝(𝑖) + 𝛽𝑥
𝑥−1
𝑠=0
∑ 𝛽𝑠𝑤ℎ(𝑖) = −𝑝(𝑖)
1 − 𝛽𝑥−1
1 − 𝛽
+ 𝛽𝑥𝑤ℎ(𝑖)
1 − 𝛽𝑇−𝑥
1 − 𝛽
.
𝑇−𝑥
𝑠=0
 
 
If x, the number of years of study is small, for 
example, five, then for the same reasons as in the 
case of an uneducated individual, one can omit the 
term 𝛽𝑇−𝑥, then 
1−𝛽𝑇−𝑥
1−𝛽
= 1. In real life, of course, 
the salary of a specialist increases with the 
experience and the main income falls on the second 
half of the career. This means that the change in the 
denominator of the progression β will affect the 
discounted income more than in the case of an 
annuity, but the quality (sign) of changes will 
remain the same. 
Thus, when making a positive decision about 
training, the difference between salaries should be 
large enough to cover the cost of training, taking 
into account the degree of impatience of the 
individual. 
The next element of the market of educational 
services, which actually produces these services, is 
a higher educational institution. The production of 
educated labor is carried out by technology with 
increasing returns to scale: for the production of a 
certain number of specialists h need to spend a year 
F + ch units of skilled work of a specialty, which 
the university itself produces. Constant costs are 
generally considered to the costs of maintaining the 
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general management apparatus of the university; its 
positions are unshakable, especially in state 
institutions. The vacant premises can be rented, and 
ordinary teachers can change the load, i.e. costs can 
be attributed to variable costs c. 
Every year the university produces  
ℎ(𝑖) specialists i, part of which replaces the retired 
labor in the national economy, and the other - in 
education. If we assume that generations have the 
same number, then every year in the national 
economy it is eliminated 
𝐶
𝑇−𝑥
skilled labor, and in 
education – 
𝐸
𝑇−𝑥
. Consequently, in sum, all 
universities should produce each year  𝐸+𝐶
𝑇−𝑥
 
graduates. 
The university's desire to maximize 
extrabudgetary income can be characterized by a 
function: 
𝜋(𝑖) = 𝑥⌊𝑝(𝑖)ℎ(𝑖) − 𝑤ℎ(𝑖)(𝐹 + 𝑐ℎ(𝑖))⌋. 
(2) 
Note that the assumption that the university pays 
specialists as much as the national economy makes 
sense for the balance. The University makes a 
decision when assigning a certain price for 
educational services and the annual number of 
students. The price, as is known from the 
individual's task, must satisfy the condition 
𝛼𝛽𝑥𝑤ℎ(𝑖) − 𝑤𝑁 ≥ 𝑝(𝑖)(1 − 𝛽
𝑥−1). In equilibrium, 
one can expect that the university will set the next 
price for an educational service: 
𝑝(𝑖) =
𝛼𝛽𝑥𝑤ℎ(𝑖) − 𝑤𝑁
1 − 𝛽𝑥−1
     
(3) 
since at this price you can recruit any number of 
students, individuals still learn or not. When the 
price decreases, the number of applicants will also 
be any within the population of the corresponding 
age, and the profit will decrease [1]. 
Since the price of training are determined by the 
difference in wages between skilled and unskilled 
workers, the balance in the labor market will affect 
the university decision for graduates, where their 
salary is determined. In other words, the university 
learns the current salary levels on the market and 
sets the price according to (3), and the output will 
be formed according to the maximization of profit 
condition. 
The condition for the existence of education can 
be rewritten, taking into account (3) as a condition 
for the difference in wages of educated and 
uneducated people: 
𝑤ℎ(𝑖)(𝛼𝛽
𝑥 − 𝑐(1 − 𝛽𝑥−1) > 𝑤𝑁 . 
The cost of the discounted flow from the salary 
of a qualified person through x years minus the cost 
of the flow of education costs should be higher than 
the cost of flow from the salary of an unskilled 
person who is starting to work now. Note that the 
inequality in income between skilled and unskilled 
people is the main condition for the existence of 
higher education. 
Then the specialist gets to the RT, composed of 
three main components, which was shown in Figure 
2: 
 relationships between employees and employers; 
 relations between subjects of the Republic of 
Tajikistan and representatives 
 (trade unions, employers' associations, 
employment services); 
 relations between the subjects of the Republic of 
Tatarstan and the state. 
Государство
Наемные 
работники
Профсоюзы
Работодатели
Организации 
работодателей
 
Figure 2 - The system of relations in the labor 
market 
The main components of the labor market are: 
the aggregate supply (P), covering all hired 
labor; and aggregate demand (C) as the general 
need of the economy for wage labor. They 
constitute the aggregate labor market. 
Thus, the part that is formed by crossing the 
aggregate demand and the aggregate supply is 
called the satisfied demand for labor (SDL). 
Non-intersecting parts correspond to the current 
market: 
CM = AM – SDL, 
where AM is the aggregate labor market; CM - 
current market. 
The current labor market is formed due to the 
natural and mechanical movement of labor and 
workplaces (the introduction of new and 
retirement of old ones). 
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Thus, it can be concluded that the more 
knowledgeable the entrants about the status of 
RT and the prestige of the university in this 
market, the share of the satisfied labor demand 
(SDL) in the total labor market is greater. 
Consequently, the unemployment rate will fall. 
Despite the strict, at first glance, mathematical 
calculations, the origins in the basics of financial 
mathematics, the methodology only a qualitative 
analysis of a limited number of parties and the 
field of employment in connection with the 
inability to specify precise quantitative values of 
model parameters. The foregoing version 
modeling is mainly qualitative, explanatory 
character. 
THE CONTINUOUS MODEL OF LABOUR 
FORCE TRAINING 
Let’s observe the continuous model. We shall 
design 𝜏 as the time - ∈ 𝑅1
+ = [0, ∞), as 𝑡 ∈ 𝑅1
+ - 
the rate of labour force training process. 𝑥  - shall 
be designed as the level of labour force education, 
𝑥 ∈ 𝑅1
+. The rate of education t is considered to be 
the control parameter that is managed by the 
employer. Let’s denote as 𝛼  the vector of k-
dimensional Euclidean space 𝑅𝑘, identifying the 
external conditions that influence on the labour 
force training. This parameter is controlled. It is 
supposed not to be predicted. The dynamics of the 
labour force training process is defined by the 
differential equation: 
?̇? = 𝑓(𝑥, 𝑡, 𝛼), 
where 𝑥(0) = 𝑥0 is the initial level of labour 
force education, 𝑓 is the continuous function 
satisfying a Lipchitz condition with respect to 𝑥: 
|𝑓(𝑥, 𝑡, 𝛼) − 𝑓(𝑥′, 𝑡, 𝛼)| ≤ 𝐾|𝑥 − 𝑥′| 
at any 𝑥, 𝑥′ ∈ 𝑅1
+, 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇, 𝛼 ∈ 𝑄, where k-positive 
constant, 𝑇, 𝑄 are variation ranges of control 
parameters 𝑡, 𝛼 correspondently; 
- a condition of solution time length: 
|𝑓(𝑥, 𝑡, 𝛼)| ≤ 𝑀 + 𝑁(𝑥) 
at any 𝑥 ∈ 𝑅1
+, 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇, 𝛼 ∈ 𝑄, where 𝑀, 𝑁 – 
positive constants; 
- a condition of vectograms convexity:  
Sets 𝑓(𝑥, 𝑇, 𝛼) = {𝑦 = 𝑓(𝑥, 𝑡, 𝛼)|𝑡 ∈ 𝑇}, sets 
𝑓(𝑥, 𝑡, 𝑄) = {𝑦 = 𝑓(𝑥, 𝑡, 𝛼)|𝛼 ∈ 𝑄} are convexed. 
The measurable function 𝑡(𝜏), 𝑡: 𝑅1
+ → 𝑇 is 
called the admissible operator control. The 
measurable function 𝛼(𝜏), 𝛼: [0, I∗] → 𝑄_ is called 
the admissible control of “uncontrolled variables”. 
The process path corresponding to the control 
couple (𝑡, 𝛼) is called the absolute continuous 
function 𝑥: [0, 𝐼∗] → 𝑅1
+, is such as that almost at 
every 𝜏 ∈ [0, I∗] the relation is fulfilled. 
?̇?(𝜏) = 𝑓(𝑥(𝜏), 𝑡(𝜏), 𝛼(τ)). 
The process is supposed at interval [0, 𝐼∗]. 
Such a process is being chosen that at the time till 
the moment 𝐼∗ the path comes up to the set 𝑋 ̃ ⊂
𝑅1
+, defined for the task in advance (game terminal 
set). The function 𝑒(𝑡, 𝛼, 𝑥, 𝜏) characterizing 
training costs is also defined in the task. If 𝑡(𝜏), 
𝛼(𝜏) are controlled operator functions and 
“uncontrolled variables” at interval [0, 𝐼∗], and 𝑥(𝜏) 
– is the corresponding process path, 
∫ 𝑒(𝑡(𝜏), 𝛼(𝜏), 𝑥(𝜏), 𝜏)𝛼𝜏 = 𝐸(𝑡, 𝛼, 𝑥(𝑡, 𝛼))
𝐼∗
0
 are 
the training costs. Let’s define two tasks in the 
model framework: 
1) using the control 𝑡(𝜏) (the rate of 
education) to bring the labour force level of 
education from the initial state to the final state 
𝑥(?̃?) ∈ ?̃? with minimal costs at any external 
conditions-controls of “uncontrolled variables”; 
2) likewise, choosing the control 𝑡(𝜏) to 
bring the level of education to the defined condition 
?̃? at minimal time and at any “uncontrolled 
variables”. 
To be definite let’s consider the first task. 
According to the meaning of the task it is natural to 
consider the upper (majorant) game Γ̅[3,5]. The 
piecewise programming strategies are defined in 
this game by the following. The strategy of the 
minimizing operator ?̅? is the couple ?̅? = (𝜎′, 𝜑𝜎′), 
where 𝜎′ is the final partition of the interval [0, 𝐼∗], 
𝜑𝜎′ is the lower strategy corresponding to the 
partition 𝜎′. This function assigns the employer’s 
information at the moment 𝜏𝑖 ∈ 𝜎′ to the 
measurable control 𝑡𝑖(τ) at the interval [𝜏𝑖 , 𝜏𝑖+1]. 
The strategy of uncontrolled variables ?̃? is the 
population {𝜓𝜎}𝜎∈Σ, where Σ is the set of all the 
final partitions of the interval [0, 𝐼∗], 𝜓𝜎  is the 
upper strategy of uncontrolled variables in the 
multistage upper game Γ̅𝜎 corresponding to the 
partition 𝜎′. This function assigns the information 
of uncontrolled variables at the moments 𝑡𝑖 ∈ 𝜎′ to 
the measured control 𝛼𝑖(𝜏) at the interval [𝜏𝑖 , 𝜏𝑖+1]. 
Let’s remember that in the upper game Γ̅𝜎 the 
employer at any period of time 𝑡𝑘 ∈ 𝜎 knows about 
the state of the process at the particular period for 
uncontrolled variables at the moments𝑡𝑘 ∈ 𝜎. 
Besides, the employer’s control selected by him at 
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the interval [𝑡𝑘, 𝑡𝑘+1] is also known. According to 
the couple strategies (?̅?, ?̅?) the unique set of control 
𝑡(𝜏), 𝛼(𝜏) at the whole interval of the game [0, 𝐼∗] 
and the corresponding process path 𝑥(𝜏) = 𝜒(?̅?, 𝛼) 
are built. It is known that [3] there is -saddle point 
for any 𝜀 > 0 in the game Γ̅. It means such a 
strategy couple ?̅?𝜀, ?̅?𝜀, that at any ?̅? ∈ 𝑇, ?̅? ∈ 𝑄 the 
inequation is fulfilled. 
 Ε(?̅?𝜀 , ?̅?, 𝜒(?̅?𝜀 , ?̅?)) + 𝜀 ≤ Ε(?̅?𝜀, ?̅?𝜀, 𝜒(?̅?𝜀, ?̅?𝜀)) ≤
Ε(?̅?, ?̅?𝜀, 𝜒(?̅?, ?̅?)) − 𝜀 
The value (?̅?𝜀, ?̅?𝜀, 𝜒(?̅?𝜀 , ?̅?𝜀)) − 𝜀 is the 
final amount of material costs that could be spent 
on the labour force training at any uncontrolled 
variables. Thus,  𝐸(𝜏) is the bending in the 
situation ?̅?𝜀?̅?𝜀. 
 
3. THE DISCRETE MODEL OF LABOUR 
FORCE TRAINING 
It is known that the labour force must take 
the training in a fixed sequence in 𝑛 directions. At 
i-step (𝑖 = 1, 𝑛̅̅ ̅̅̅) depending on the rate of labour 
force education chosen by the employer that should 
be constant at this step and the vector of external 
conditions, 𝑒𝑖(𝑡𝑖 , 𝛼𝑖 , 𝑥𝑖−1) material costs are spent 
on the training. During the whole period of training 
at 𝑛 steps-operations the following amount of 
material costs is spent 
 
∑ 𝑒𝑖(𝑡𝑖, 𝛼𝑖 , 0𝑥𝑖−1) = 𝜀𝑛(𝑡1, … , 𝑡𝑛, 𝛼1, … , 𝛼𝑛)
𝑛
𝑖=1
= 𝜀𝑛(𝑡
𝑛, 𝛼𝑛) 
 
 The limits of possible variables in the rate 
of training are defined at every step 𝑖 and the vector 
of external conditions: 
𝑡𝑖 ∈ 𝑇𝑖 = [𝑡𝑖
1, 𝑡𝑖
2]; 𝛼𝑖 ∈ 𝑄𝑖 = [𝛼𝑖
1, 𝛼𝑖
2] 
 
As in the 1st section, it is required to 
choose such a control sequence 𝑡 = {𝑡𝑖}, that can 
assure the least material costs at any possible 
external conditions 𝛼 = {𝛼𝑖}. It should be noticed 
that the labour force continue to be in i-state during 
the long period of time but the external conditions 
can change. So, in this case the set of states for the 
external conditions vector presents the set of 
functions at a time limit. It is natural to consider 
this set of functions as a compact space leaving the 
labeling Q. 
It is supposed that the number of steps 𝑛 is 
such that the set of required level of education ?̃? is 
achieved at any control {𝑡𝑖} and any functions of 
external conditions{𝛼𝑖}. We shall define by 𝐹𝑛(𝑥0) 
the minimal assured material costs during the 
training process at 𝑛 steps, initial education level 𝑥0 
and any external conditions: 
 
𝐹𝑛(𝑥0) = min
𝑡
max
𝛼
𝑒𝑛(𝑡𝛼
𝑛, 𝛼𝑛, 𝑥𝑛) 
 
It is easy to check that the method of 
dynamic programming is applied here. This method 
allows comprising recursion relation binding the 
values of the Bellman’s function at two 
consequently connected values of n parameter 
 
𝐹𝑛(𝑥0) = min
𝑡1
max
𝛼1
{𝑒1(𝑡1, 𝛼1, 𝑥0) − 𝐹𝑛−1(𝑥1)} , 
𝑥1 = 𝑥0 + ∆𝑡1𝑓(𝑥0, 𝑡1, 𝛼1). 
 
4. CONCLUSION 
The numerical evaluations done by PC for 
a discrete model at 𝑛 = 3 verified theoretical 
calculations. The modeling of the labour force 
training becomes essential for the research of 
labour force training patterns, for the estimation of 
how the level of education influences on the 
economic development, for designing the methods 
and procedures of the labour force management. 
The content of the training process and use of 
labour force make urgent the research of the 
training peculiarities under the conditions of the 
market economy in Russia and in a particular 
region. 
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